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Madness and Literature: Foucault’s Encounter
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to outline the connection between literature, madness and lan-
guage in Foucault’s philosophy. In the first part of the paper, these three discursive bases are 
situated in the “cosmos of madness” in the sense of what Serres calls “the archaeology of 
psychology” and Caputo “the deconstruction of psychology”. This part marks the language 
of literature as a decomposing space of the “tribunal of the cogito” (Derrida). The second 
part explicates the impetus of “literature language”, trying to promote lunatic manifesta-
tions that are the works of three authors, Dostoevsky, De Sade and Artaud, and how their 
work has a symbiotic connection with the work of Foucault. The paper ends with the con-
nection of the unreasonable and parrēsia as an opportunity that could be manifested only 
in literature as a habitus to exist in. Finally, as Foucault notes, the “language of literature” 
is the “language of madness” or the possibility of freedom of the expression of our Being.
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“Literature is the most agreeable way of ignoring life.”1
Fernando Pessoa
“What interested me and guided me was 
a certain presence of madness in literature.”2
Michel Foucault 
“Du côté de la folie”3





1   
Cf.	 Fernando	Pessoa,	The Book of Disquiet, 
translated	by	Richard	Zenith,	Penguin	Books,	
New	York	–	London	2002.
2   
Cf.	 Michel	 Foucault,	 Foucault Live (Inter-
views, 1961-1984),	 Sylvère	 Lotringer	 (ed.),	
translated	by	Lysa	Hochroth,	 John	Johnston,	
Semiotext(e),	New	York	1996.





greatly	 orient	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 paper	 be-
cause	Foucault’s	approach	inevitably	leads	us	
to	the	dialogue	between	madness	and	reason,	
























our hitherto interpretations about madness,9	as	Derrida	asserts:
“…	(letting)	madness	speaking	about	itself.”10








to	 transcendental	 interpretation	on	 this	 issue.	Moreover,	 detected	 are	 those	
“intra-histories”15	 whose	 vocation	 has	 been	 deafened;	 those	 “small	 narra-
tives”16	 that	 expose	 the	 “anarchitecture	 of	 oppression”	which	 uprooted	 the	
dialogue	between	madness	and	reason	under	the	rational	delirium	of	creating	
the	perfect	polis.	The	consequence	of	 the	“entelecheia of polis” is	 the	cre-
ation	of	an	essentially	moral,	scientific/practical/medical	legal	basis	under	the	
banner	of	‘pathology’/disease	and	the	theory	of	cogito ergo sum	(Descartes),	
that as a lumen naturale17	under	the	“tribunal	of	cogito”18 (Derrida) removes 
the	problem	of	madness	with	the	exercise	of	reason19	which,	as	a	marking,	
uses	denigrating	(epistemic/ontological)	word	formation	for	the	excluded	as	

























4   
Michel	 Foucault,	 “Madness	 Exists	 Only	 in	
Society”,	in:	M.	Foucault,	Foucault Live, pp. 
7–9,	p.	8.
5	   
Ibid.
6	   
Foucault’s	interpreters	detected	that	a	history	
of	madness	 cannot	 be	written	 by	 those	who	








(…)	Confinement	 is	 the	 concrete	manifesta-
tion	 of	 an	 entire	 readjustment	 of	 the	 ethical	




standing Foucault: Understanding Modern-
ism,	Bloomsbury,	New	York	–	London	2017,	
pp.	21–37,	p.	24.
7	   
John	 Caputo,	 “On	 Not	 Knowing	 Who	 We	
Are:	 Madness	 and	 Hermeneutics,	 and	 the	
Night	 of	Truth	 in	Foucault”,	 in:	 John	Capu-
to, Mark Yount, Foucault and the Critique of 
Institutions,	 The	 Pennsylvania	 State	Univer-
sity	 Press,	 Pennsylvania	 1993,	 pp.	 233–262,	
p. 233.
8	  
Peter	 Sloterdijk,	 Philosophical Tempera-
ments: From Plato to Foucault,	translated	by	
Thomas	Dunlap,	Columbia	University	Press,	
New	York	2013,	p.	97.
9   
J.	G.	Merquior,	Foucault,	p.	26.
10	   
Jacques	 Derrida,	 Writing and Difference, 
translated	by	Alan	Bass,	Routledge,	New	York	
–	London	2001,	p.	39.
11   
For	Foucault,	archeology	detects	unconscious	




sets	 in	 the	 historical	 system	 of	 non-formal	
knowledge	(Merquior)	and	consequently	con-
stitutes	archaeological	thought.
12   
Michel	 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowl-
edge,	 translated	 by	 A.	 M.	 Sheridan	 Smith,	
Routledge,	New	York	–	London	2002,	p.	202.
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J.	G.	Merquior,	Foucault,	p.	18.
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M.	Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 
p.	203.
15	   
Cf.	Miguel	de	Unamuno,	En torno al casticis-
mo,	Espasa-Calpe,	Madrid	1968.
16	   
According	 to	 Mieke	 Ball,	 known	 for	 her	
concept	of	narratology,	‘small	narratives’	are	







rative	 is	 Our	 Best	 Tool”],	 Symbol	 5	 (2015),	
interview	(led	by	Ag	Apolloni),	pp.	8–28,	p.	
28.	Cf.	Mieke	Ball,	Narratology: Introduction 
to the Theory of Narratives,	University	of	To-
ronto	Press,	Toronto	–	London	2009.
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Muhamedin  Kullashi,  a  philosopher  from  








Kullashi, Vetëpërkufizimi i Njeriut,  Rilindja,  
Prishtinë	1987,	p.	115.
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J. Derrida, Writing and Difference,	p.	37.
19   
Descartes’	 fear	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 chapter	




























































production”35	 historically	was	 always	 suppressed	 and	 its	 language	was	 al-
ways	seen	with	a	double	character.	Firstly,	that	of	a	lack	of	eloquence,	which	
cartes,	through	cogito ergo sum,	stratifies	 the	
gap	between	madness	and	reason,	denying	the	
existence	 of	 the	 one	 who	 does	 not	 think.	 It	
follows	 that	 from	 the	dialogue	on	 creativity,	
the	mad	becomes	 invisible	 to	classical	 ratio-
nalism,	and	seems	that	this	historical	moment	
creates	 the	 platform	 for	 the	 ‘perfect	 world’.	
What	 does	 the	 concept	 the perfect world 
mean?	 It	 is	 the	 secularized	 version	 of	 theo-
logical	premises	and	an	example	for	this	con-
ceptual	 transformation	 is	 the	 transition	 from	
the	 theology	 of	 history	 to	 the	 philosophy	 of	
history.	A	focal	point	is	Descartes’	mark of the 
mental	(term	coined	by	Richard	Rorty	–	Rich-
ard	Rorty,	Philosophy and Mirror of Nature, 
Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton	–	New	
Jersey	 1980,	 p.	 17),	 that	 defenestrates	mad-




of	madness	 once	 and	 for	 all;	 this	 cleansing,	
metaphorically	 speaking,	 from	 an	 historical	
perspective	could	be	visualized	with	the	tran-
sition	 from	 ‘ship	 of	 fools’	 as	 hope	 for	 puri-
fication	 of	 soul	 in	 asylum	 that,	 for	 Foucault	
and	 Goffman,	 signifies	 dehumanization	 (for	
more	detailed	 reading	 about	 the	problematic	
of	asylums	I	recommend	the	book	by	Erving	
Goffman, Asylums: essays of social situation 




ple:	Edgar	Morin,	Penser L’Europe, Galimard 
Education,	Paris	 1990;	George	Steiner,	Nos-
talgia for the Absolute,	Annasi	Press	LTD,	To-
ronto	2004;	Astrit	Salihu,	Aporitë e Modernes 
(Kritika e rëfimëve	 të	 mëdha),	 Qendra	 për	
studime	 humanistike	 “Gani	 Bobi”,	 Prishtinë	
2009;	 Blerim	 Latifi,	 Metafizika e Emancipi-





perfection	 of	 the	 humanities.	 Derrida’s	 con-
cerns	 regarding	 Foucault’s	History of Mad-
ness	would	 inspire	 Foucault	 to	write	 two	 of	
his  seminal  books,  The Order of Things: An 
Archeology of the Human Sciences,	in	which	
he	proclaims	“the	death	of	man”	and	decom-
poses	 the	 subject-centric	 view	 present	 from	




ject-centric(ism)	 is	 coined	 by	 Astrit	 Salihu.	
Cf. A. Salihu, Aporitë e Modernes.
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Cf.	René	Descartes,	Meditations on First Phi-
losophy,	translated	by	John	Cottingham,	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	1996.
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John	Caputo	detected	in	Greek	antiquity	that	
nothing	articulated	was	excluded	from	logos, 
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Lucian	 of	 Samosata	 was	 a	 famous	 ancient	
Greek	 satirist,	 who	 was	 an	 inspiration	 for	
Erasmus.	 He	 used	 the	 concept	 of	morosoph 
to  denote  the  other  side  of  philosopher,  as  
William	Tooke	will	 state	 in	 the	 footnote	 ex-
plaining	the	concept	of	morosoph	in	the	con-
text	of	Lucian’s	work:	“Morosophs	are	those	





for	matter.	 If	 fact	 or	 something	 ascertained,	
may	not	be	at	a	bottom	of	chimera.”	–	Lucian	

























“Language	 is	 our	 only	 resource,	 our	 only	 source.	 It	 reveals	 to	 us	 in	 the	 very	 hollow	of	 our	
memories	and	beneath	each	of	our	words,	beneath	each	of	those	words	that	gallop	through	our	
head,	it	reveals	the	majestic	freedom	of	being	mad.”38














tion	 of	man,	where	 his	wings	 are	 clipped	 from	 dehumanizing	 normalcy	 –	
there	he	comprehends	the	un-sayable,	as	noted	by	one	of	the	representatives	
of	anti-psychiatry	David	Cooper	in	his	book	The Language of Madness:



















mus	work	The Praise of Folly;	Erasmus,	 by	
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er-known	French	philosopher	Jacques	Martin,	
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Luis	Althusser	and	Michel	Foucault.	Accord-
ing	 to	 many	 interpreters,	 Foucault	 uses	 this	
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36	   
S. Felman, Writing and Madness, p. 41.
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M.	Foucault,	History of Madness,	p.	xxviii.
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Michel	 Foucault,	 Language, Madness, and 
Desire: On Literature,	 translated	 by	 Rober-
to	Bononno,	University	 of	Minnesota	 Press,	
Minneapolis,	London	2015,	p.	27.






epoch	 to	 another,	 but	what	 does	 not	 change	
is	 that	 thinking	 cannot	 alter	 the	 form	 of	 the	
disclosive	event	of	Being.	By	contrast,	Fou-




tive  on  the  temporal  understanding of  Being 
in	 discontinuity	 of	 history	 of	 truth	 of	Being	
differs	very	little	from	Foucault’s	perspective	
in	the	sense	that	he	addresses	his	own	finitude	
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of	hyper-morality46  from us to understand it.  Literature is autonomous both 















to	articulate	non-eloquence	and	the	poverty	of	madness.50 Repressed and si-
lenced	speech	acts	take	shelter	in	the	‘language	of	literature’,	and	we	know	
them	as	“anonymity	of	murmur” 51	or	as	“multitude	of	voices”.52 The meta-
phorical	language	of	literature	is	itself	the	pathos	of	madness.	This	symbiotic	
connection	between	 literature	and	madness	manifests	 the	power	of	 the	 lost	
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M.	 Foucault,	 Language, Madness, and De-
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that  there  is  a  kind  of  liberation  in  the  Phe-
nomenology of Spirit),	Nietzsche	 tries	 to	put	
thought into madness. Cf. S. Felman, Writing 
and Madness,	p.	36.
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M.	Foucault,	History of Madness,	p.	237.
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Michel	 Foucault,	 “The	Thought	 of	 the	 Out-
side”,	in:	James	D.	Faubion	(ed.),	Aesthetics, 
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above:	 Dostoevsky,	 De	 Sade,	Artaud.	As	 long	 as	 the	 world	 has	 produced	







toevsky),	Licentious Manifesto  (De  Sade),  Un-Reason Manifesto  (Artaud).  
Besides	the	reasons	mentioned	above,	the	common	denominator	of	the	pro-
tagonists	of	 the	novels	 in	question	is	“ontological	 insecurity”.62 Within this 
insecurity,	one	can	testify	to	the	non-verbal	murmur	of	madness	and	thought	
in	the	un-thoughtful.	This	silence	that	speaks	for	itself	seems	to	have	its	roots	
in	Heidegger	and	his	concept	of	 ‘language	speaks’;	 this	Heideggerian	 root	
in	the	modified	 version	of	Foucault	shows	us	as	“the	language	of	literature	
that	 speaks	 for	 itself”,63	 so	 in	 this	“ontological	 insecurity”	an	“ontology	of	


































punishment	 that	comes	from	moral	 justice.	Dostoevsky	tends	 to	emphasize	
the	difference	between	the	social	norm	“sick”	and	biological	norm	“sickness”,	
as	Caputo	also	claims:





“…	in	Notes from Underground parallel numerous modern notions about mental illness, espe-
cially	the	concepts	of	the	obsessive	compulsive,	masochist,	paranoid,	schizophrenic,	epileptic	
and	‘detached	neurotic’,	but	also	the	sadism	of	displaced	hostility.”72
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and	 Morality:	 Dostoyevsky	 and	 His	 Under-
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“See	gentlemen,	 reason	does	 it	 job	good,	 this	could	not	be	denied;	nevertheless	 reason	only	
satisfies	reasonable	human	abilities,	whereas	desire	is	complete	manifestation	of	life,	meaning	
all	life,	including	reason	and	its	surroundings.”73























B) Licentious Manifesto (De Sade)









there	are	only	lusts	which	are	suppressed.	In	his	book	History of Madness, 


















kind of insanitas (not	of	a	sound	mind)	that	has	licentiousness	in	the	form	of	
erudition,	and	on	the	other	hand	there	is	the	history	of	sexuality	where	de	Sade	

















tious	 is	based	precisely	on	 the	nakedness	not	only	of	 the	body	but	 also	of	
being;	the	naked	being	is	not	subject	to	any	kind	of	moral	arbitrariness,	so	as	
Bataille	asserts:
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ing from ars erotica to scientia sexualis.83	This	transition	will	change	the	Vic-
torian	world	of	Reich	once	and	for	all.	The	subconscious	dream	is	already	
appearing	to	us	through	the	delirious	mourns	excitation.
C) Un-Reason Manifesto (Artaud)
Within	Foucault’s	concept,	Antonin	Artaud	“is	the	name	that	madness	could	





























the man suicided by society	is	a	radical	critique	of	socious88	–	a	normal,	sick	
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who,	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 Foucault	 and	
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the	power	games	of	normalcy,	especially	 in	“Marxland”,	which	 in	 its	most	


















that	 only	 in	 literature	 is	 rationalism	 shattered	by	 the	 unreasonable,	 and	on	
the	other	hand	the	capillarity	of	power	becomes	apparent	as	an	opportunity	
for parrēsia,	which	 in	 the	Roman	language	would	be	 translated	as	 libertas 
as	a	kind	of	intensification	of	freedom.100	Only	literature	makes	possible	“the	













Svrha je priloga ocrtati vezu među književnošću, ludilom i jezikom u Foucaultovoj filozofiji. U 
prvom dijelu rada tri se diskurzivne baze smještaju u »kozmos ludila« u smislu kako to Serres 
zove »arheologija psihologije«, a Caputo »dekonstrukcija psihologije«. Ovaj dio obilježava 
jezik književnosti kao prostor dekomponiranja »tribunala cogita« (Derrida). Drugi dio ekspli-
cira impetus »jezika književnosti«, nastojeći promicati lunatičke manifestacije Dostojevskog, 
De Sadea i Artauda, te kako njihovi radovi imaju simbiotičke veze s Foucaultovim radom. Rad 
završava raspravom o nerazumnom i parrēsiji kao prilici koja se može pojaviti samo u knji-
ževnosti kao mjestu opstojanja. Konačno, kako Foucault bilježi, »jezik književnosti« jest »jezik 




Wahnsinn und Literatur: Foucaults Auseinandersetzung
Zusammenfassung
Der Zweck des Beitrags ist es, den Zusammenhang zwischen Literatur, Wahnsinn und Sprache 
in Foucaults Philosophie zu schildern. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden drei diskursive Grund-
lagen in den „Kosmos des Wahnsinns“ gestellt, in dem Sinne, wie Serres es die „Archäologie 
der Psychologie“ und Caputo es die „Dekonstruktion der Psychologie“ nennt. Dieser Teil kenn-
zeichnet die Sprache der Literatur als einen Raum für die Dekomponierung des „Tribunals 
des Cogito“ (Derrida). Der zweite Teil expliziert den Impetus der „Sprache der Literatur“, 
indem er die lunatischen Manifestationen von Dostojewski, De Sade und Artaud sowie die sym-
biotischen Verbindungen ihrer Werke zum Werk Foucaults zu akzentuieren trachtet. Das Paper 
schließt mit einer Erörterung über das Unvernünftige und die Parrhesie (parrēsia) als Gelegen-
heit, die lediglich in der Literatur als dem Ort des Fortbestands auftauchen kann. Letzten En-
des, wie Foucault es notiert, ist die „Sprache der Literatur“ eben die „Sprache des Wahnsinns“ 
oder die Möglichkeit zur Ausdrucksfreiheit unseres Seins.
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Folie et littérature : l’escarmouche de Foucault
Résumé
L’objectif de ce texte est d’établir un lien entre la littérature, la folie et le langage dans la 
philosophie de Foucault. La première partie du travail institue trois bases discursives dans le 
« cosmos de la folie » au sens de « archéologie de la psychologie » comme l’entend Serres, ou 
de « déconstruction de la psychologie », selon Caputo. Cette partie caractérise le langage de 
la littérature comme espace de décomposition du « tribunal du cogito » (Derrida). La deuxième 
partie explicite l’impetus du « langage de la littérature » visant à promouvoir les manifestations 
lunatiques de Dostoïevski, du Marquis de Sade et d’Artaud, et la manière dont leurs travaux 
présentent un lien symbiotique avec le travail de Foucault. Le travail se termine par une discus-
sion sur le déraisonnable et la parrêsia comme occasion qui peut faire son apparition seulement 
dans la littérature en tant que lieu d’existence. Enfin, à la manière dont Foucault le caractérise, 
« le langage de la littérature » est le « le langage de la folie » ou la possibilité de liberté d’ex-
pression de notre Être. 
Mots-clés
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